DesDiv 91 (Duncan, Mansfield, Frank Knox, and DeHaven) departed Yokosuka on 19 October 1961 on our first southern area deployment since DesRon NINE's recent homeporting, and reporting to ComDesFlot ONE for operational control. As I recall it was a cruise of two to three weeks, when we familiarized ourselves with part of the operational area we would soon be calling our home away from home ----- Bashi Channel, Taiwan Straights, Sea of Japan, and the South China Sea, as well as visits to Kaoshiung, and Subic Bay.

ComDesFlot ONE and Com Seventh Fleet soon recognized the newly homeported ship's greater familiarity with, and in, the WesPac operating area, and used them to the utmost, often selecting certain of them for special tasks and missions.

EARLY ENTRY INTO THE VIETNAM AREA.

Sometime, several deployments and many steaming miles after our arrival in Yokosuka, it must have been in early spring ' 62, are possibly very late '61, our first special tasking arose.  It began with an unscheduled night time departure from Subic Bay to rendezvous with the Coral Sea. Coral Sea had just received a deck load of helicopters from Clark Field, and was to deliver them to our Military Assistance Group (MAG) in Vietnam.  We were to screen and escort her on her journey.  Weather was clear and generally calm, except for a long low surface swell from the southwest.

It was a rushed delivery, necessitating a rather high speed of advance. As we rushed toward Vietnam, steaming directly into the very long heavy swells, it was rough going for the Coral Sea --plunging and shuddering on each encountered swell. She was taking a first class beating. And in unusual contrast, DeHaven's more modest length permitted us to ride more gently up, over, and down the long reach of the dead-on waves. There were periodic nighttime queries from the Coral Sea , with concern for how her small boy was riding; and her apparent disbelief was evident when our replies reported in the destroyerman's usual style, "Comfortably, thank you". 

The Coral Sea lost one of her deckside elevators as she continued to press our speed of advance. Fortunately the incident involved no serious injury or loss of life. A bit of humor was provided, at least in DeHaven, when our first awareness of the accident was provided when our lifebuoy watch reported to the bridge that he had just overheard the Coral Sea life buoy watch say he had, "just seen his cleaning station pass down the side of the ship!"

A noted combat artist, R.G. Smith, captured well our transit with a painting entitled "Sudden Squall". The painting portrays Coral Sea in somewhat heavy weather, with DeHaven in the foreground on station on her port beam, with hull numbers, 43 and 727 showing clearly. The painting received rather wide distribution, and still hangs prominently in several Pentagon and other government offices in the Washington D.C. area. 

Historically, I believe this trip is recognized as the first injection of U.S. helicopters into the hands of our Military Assistance Group in Vietnam.

We returned to Yokosuka after a brief visit in Hong Kong with the Coral Sea.

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

The Cuban Missile Crisis and DeHaven's involvement, without question provided a few days the memory of which will dwell with many of us for much time to come.  All able Seventh Fleet ships had been ordered to sea, and were steaming in several groups in various widely dispersed geographic areas.  Aware of the presence of Soviet intelligence collecting trawlers in our area, our group was in continual movement.  We watched closely the developing world tensions, as we moved progressively from DefCon Four to DefCon One.  DefCon ONE, then being the highest state of readiness, and the one from which the Strategic Integrated Operation Plan, the SIOP, would be executed if necessary. The SIOP was the plan all knew as the one in which all services would simultaneously release all weapons toward and onto preplanned designated Soviet targets. It was the plan which heavily influenced all military and naval unit operational training during the Cold War years. Too, it was a plan continually rehearsed, but one which we prayed would never have to be executed.  It included utilization of our full national nuclear capability and would be executed only on direct orders from the highest command authority, the President's National Command Center, and would be ordered in a manner by which there could be no question or doubt as to its authenticity.

Most all naval units, especially those deployed to the Mediterranean and Wespac were not unaware of their general missions and responsibility assignments upon SIOP execution; however the specifics would only be revealed and updated by orders on execution.  As one would expect, running with the carriers at that time, DeHaven's mission assignments would have related to an ASW responsibility far from the carriers, with a post strike rendezvous identified for assembly and reorganization of surviving units. Hence, it was with much prayerful concern that we checked and rechecked our internal readiness status, stood ready, and waited. It was with an even greater amount of offered thankfulness and relief when we subsequently were permitted to stand down toward our usual Seventh Fleet defensive posture. Those several hours, when much of the world held its breath, as our naval blockade of Cuba was taking effect, provided an opportunity for many sobering thoughts ---- thoughts of families and loved ones ashore, who in circumstances such as those contemplated in SIOP planning, would no longer have been shielded from actions by the Soviets. 

THE TSINGTOA PROBING MISSION.

The second time DeHaven drew a special task from ComSeventh Fleet; it was one of such a nature that even our Squadron Commander was not aware in advance.  It involved a single ship probing operation into the Yellow Sea, and stands as probably the most memorable event during my DeHaven days. It was a time when one could not have been more proud of the confidence and professional enthusiasm demonstrated by all hands. 

The First DESOTO Patrols

A Newsletter from this period